I think you might have underestimated the sophistication of the Truman Administration, since your argument (which obviously cannot cover everything in Asia at the time) fails to explain why Indonesians under the leadership of Sukarno had been able to win the active support of the United States in their struggle for independence from the Dutch.
There are, I guess, two factors that may account for the failure of Vietnamese and the success of Indonesians in this regard.
First, the fact that Hồ Chí Minh was a Communist, while Sukarno was not. It could be argued that the Indonesian leader had gone out of his way to prove to the United States his anti-Communist credentials.
“On 18 September 1948,” says Wikipedia, “an ‘Indonesian Soviet Republic’ was declared in Madiun, east of Yogyakarta, by members of the PKI and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). Judging the times as right for a proletarian uprising, they intended it to be a rallying centre for revolt against “Sukarno-Hatta, the slaves of the Japanese and America”. Madiun however was won back by Republican forces within a few weeks and the insurgency leader, Musso, killed. RM Suryo, the governor of East Java, several police officers and religious leaders were killed by the rebels. This ended a distraction for the revolution,[and it turned vague American sympathies based on anti-colonial sentiments into diplomatic support. Internationally, the Republic was now seen as being staunchly anti-communist and a potential ally in the emerging global Cold War between the American-led ‘free world’ and the Soviet-led bloc.”
A golden opportunity like this was, for obvious reasons, not available to Hồ Chí Minh.
Second, France, the European country that wanted to re-establish her power over Vietnam, was way more important to the United States than the Netherlands, which intended to accomplish a similar goal in Indonesia. The American government had been able to do to the Dutch what it could not do to the French: Using economic clout to induce an obstinate ally to grant independence to its colony. France was simply too big to be told by the United States what to do and the United States needed her in the defense of Western Europe against the danger from the Communist East. The Netherlands, by contrast, was, politically speaking, un quantité négligeable.
It is instructive to quote Wikipedia once again:
“[In response to Dutch military campaigns,] United States aid specifically earmarked for Dutch Indonesia efforts was immediately cancelled and pressure mounted within the U.S. Congress for all United States aid to be cut off. This included Marshall Plan funds vital for Dutch post-World War II rebuilding that had so far totalled $US 1 billion. The Netherlands Government had spent an amount equivalent to almost half of this funding their campaigns in Indonesia. That United States aid could be used to fund “a senile and ineffectual imperialism” encouraged many key voices in the United States – including those amongst the U.S. Republican Party – and from within American churches and NGOs to speak out in support of Indonesian independence.”
In view of Sukarno’s eventual success in obtaining American support for Indonesian independence, we may conclude that Hồ Chí Minh was right in his attempt to do the same for Vietnam. The Truman Administration, however, seemed to have equally sound reasons to ignore Hồ’s plea.
riroriro
11 years ago
More about Indonesia . In 1965 , the US embassy instigated a Chili – like coup d’Etat against the same Sukarno . High -level Indonesian generals were assassinated ( by whom ? ) . The Indonesian communist party was accused of the murders . One million persons were massacred, not only communists but also noncommunists : leftists , trade uinonists , intellectuals ;
the chinese community suffered everywhere in the country horrendous pogroms from the hands of the natives . The events were considered as a great victory for the USA , the NYT and other medias crowed with glee
Saigon Buffalo, there is an oral interview on the Truman library webpage with Frederick Nolting (worked in the State Department), and he talks about why Indonesia and Indochina were treated differently by the US.
NOLTING: Well, this question has come up often. Most recently a young man who’s writing his Ph.D. dissertation came to see me, inquiring about the difference in the attitude of the State Department vis-a-vis Indonesia on the one hand and Indochina on the other. As it happened, I had worked op the Indonesian problem early in my State Department career and on Vietnam late in that career. He said specifically — and perhaps your question could be answered or be put in these terms — what was the difference? Why on the one hand were we, in the late forties, putting pressure on the Dutch to come to some political agreement with Sukarno’s movement for independence in Indonesia and on the other hand, by and large, supporting the French attempt to re-establish French authority in Indochina Didn’t the two policies seem inconsistent,
[7]
but I was assigned to one and not to the other. It so happened that the Netherlands were in the Northern European Affairs Division of the State Department, and France was in Western European Affairs; that’s a technicality. But there were two major factors, I think, why the policies were different in the State Department and in the U.S. Government, generally. One was that Sukarno was regarded, in those days, rightly or wrongly, as a genuine nationalist — untainted by an education in Moscow, untainted by charges of being a Communist. This changed later on, but in those days he was regarded as a genuine, popular nationalist. Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, having been educated in Moscow, was regarded as anything but a genuine nationalist. Again, I say rightly or wrongly, this is historical.
The other factor was that, in general, the Netherlands politically was staunch, stable, and not thinking about having a coalition in Government
[8]
with the Communist Party. France, on the other hand, was weak governmentally and unstable — could very easily have been pushed over into a coalition type government. So, the maintenance or the promotion of a strong centrist-oriented government in France was a great consideration, I think, and one reason why the United States didn’t press France harder on the question of Indochina and, in fact, sent great quantities of aid to the French expeditionary armed forces and those Indochinese fighting on the French side against the Viet Minh. In the case of Holland, you had a division of opinion within Holland itself as to whether or not they should try to hold on to the Netherlands Indies. Some excellent Dutch people were in disagreement, I think, with the Netherlands policy on pragmatic grounds. They didn’t think they had the force; they didn’t think they had the money; and they didn’t think it was worth the candle. The huge archipelago of the East Indies, with then some 70 million people, was perhaps too much for a small country the size of Holland (with about 1.0 million people then) to try to control indefinitely. The
[9]
government, however, was in a bind. They had strong tires with Indonesia, and they felt a certain responsibility for it, which was quite correct. They wanted, at least, an orderly transition to some form, first, of a union with the Netherlands under the Dutch Queen. Then, perhaps, gradually, as the institutions of self-government were developed, they would turn more and more power over. But they felt an obligation for the defense of Indonesia; they felt an obligation for its financial responsibilities; and they also felt that once order was restored there would be a good partnership arrangement beneficial to both sides that would be possible. So, you had this division of opinion within Holland itself.
Thank you very much for the reference to the interview with Ambassador Frederick Nolting!
His discussion of the matter could only help lure us still deeper into the realm of speculations. It obviously gives rise to the question as to what the United States would have done, had Vietnamese non-Communists been able to prevent the seizure of power by Communists in August 1945. My guess is that at the end of the day the American government would have acquiesced to France’s reconquest of Vietnam, no matter who was/were in charge of its independence movement. The United States at the time could not ignore or oppose the desire, however delusional, of a big ally in the all-important European theater to maintain its grandeur at the global level. Ambassador Nolting was, of course, too much a diplomatic veteran to say it bluntly, but he seemed to have alluded to this point by attributing to “[s]ome excellent Dutch people” the thought that “[t]he huge archipelago of the East Indies, with then some 70 million people, was perhaps too much for a small country the size of Holland (with about 1.0 million people then) to try to control indefinitely.”
riroriro
11 years ago
Another historical analogy than VN/Philippines has been more talked about , it’ s HCM / Tito
I agree , one cannot talk about a lost historical opportunity , when one remembers the then world and internal USA context . The Cold War has reared its head when Churchill in his famed 1946 speech about the Iron Curtain assailed Soviet hold on Eastern Europe
Inside the USA , anticommunism was already brewing since 1917 , there was the first Red Scare after the birth of the Soviet Union . Soon after the Soviet acquisition of the H bomb , the catching of Soviet spies ( i.e. Rosenbergs ) , tha Americans became obsessional anti communists as materialized by the McCarthy witchhunts which raged from 1947 to 1953
I think you might have underestimated the sophistication of the Truman Administration, since your argument (which obviously cannot cover everything in Asia at the time) fails to explain why Indonesians under the leadership of Sukarno had been able to win the active support of the United States in their struggle for independence from the Dutch.
There are, I guess, two factors that may account for the failure of Vietnamese and the success of Indonesians in this regard.
First, the fact that Hồ Chí Minh was a Communist, while Sukarno was not. It could be argued that the Indonesian leader had gone out of his way to prove to the United States his anti-Communist credentials.
“On 18 September 1948,” says Wikipedia, “an ‘Indonesian Soviet Republic’ was declared in Madiun, east of Yogyakarta, by members of the PKI and the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). Judging the times as right for a proletarian uprising, they intended it to be a rallying centre for revolt against “Sukarno-Hatta, the slaves of the Japanese and America”. Madiun however was won back by Republican forces within a few weeks and the insurgency leader, Musso, killed. RM Suryo, the governor of East Java, several police officers and religious leaders were killed by the rebels. This ended a distraction for the revolution,[and it turned vague American sympathies based on anti-colonial sentiments into diplomatic support. Internationally, the Republic was now seen as being staunchly anti-communist and a potential ally in the emerging global Cold War between the American-led ‘free world’ and the Soviet-led bloc.”
A golden opportunity like this was, for obvious reasons, not available to Hồ Chí Minh.
Second, France, the European country that wanted to re-establish her power over Vietnam, was way more important to the United States than the Netherlands, which intended to accomplish a similar goal in Indonesia. The American government had been able to do to the Dutch what it could not do to the French: Using economic clout to induce an obstinate ally to grant independence to its colony. France was simply too big to be told by the United States what to do and the United States needed her in the defense of Western Europe against the danger from the Communist East. The Netherlands, by contrast, was, politically speaking, un quantité négligeable.
It is instructive to quote Wikipedia once again:
“[In response to Dutch military campaigns,] United States aid specifically earmarked for Dutch Indonesia efforts was immediately cancelled and pressure mounted within the U.S. Congress for all United States aid to be cut off. This included Marshall Plan funds vital for Dutch post-World War II rebuilding that had so far totalled $US 1 billion. The Netherlands Government had spent an amount equivalent to almost half of this funding their campaigns in Indonesia. That United States aid could be used to fund “a senile and ineffectual imperialism” encouraged many key voices in the United States – including those amongst the U.S. Republican Party – and from within American churches and NGOs to speak out in support of Indonesian independence.”
In view of Sukarno’s eventual success in obtaining American support for Indonesian independence, we may conclude that Hồ Chí Minh was right in his attempt to do the same for Vietnam. The Truman Administration, however, seemed to have equally sound reasons to ignore Hồ’s plea.
More about Indonesia . In 1965 , the US embassy instigated a Chili – like coup d’Etat against the same Sukarno . High -level Indonesian generals were assassinated ( by whom ? ) . The Indonesian communist party was accused of the murders . One million persons were massacred, not only communists but also noncommunists : leftists , trade uinonists , intellectuals ;
the chinese community suffered everywhere in the country horrendous pogroms from the hands of the natives . The events were considered as a great victory for the USA , the NYT and other medias crowed with glee
Saigon Buffalo, there is an oral interview on the Truman library webpage with Frederick Nolting (worked in the State Department), and he talks about why Indonesia and Indochina were treated differently by the US.
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/nolting.htm
NOLTING: Well, this question has come up often. Most recently a young man who’s writing his Ph.D. dissertation came to see me, inquiring about the difference in the attitude of the State Department vis-a-vis Indonesia on the one hand and Indochina on the other. As it happened, I had worked op the Indonesian problem early in my State Department career and on Vietnam late in that career. He said specifically — and perhaps your question could be answered or be put in these terms — what was the difference? Why on the one hand were we, in the late forties, putting pressure on the Dutch to come to some political agreement with Sukarno’s movement for independence in Indonesia and on the other hand, by and large, supporting the French attempt to re-establish French authority in Indochina Didn’t the two policies seem inconsistent,
[7]
but I was assigned to one and not to the other. It so happened that the Netherlands were in the Northern European Affairs Division of the State Department, and France was in Western European Affairs; that’s a technicality. But there were two major factors, I think, why the policies were different in the State Department and in the U.S. Government, generally. One was that Sukarno was regarded, in those days, rightly or wrongly, as a genuine nationalist — untainted by an education in Moscow, untainted by charges of being a Communist. This changed later on, but in those days he was regarded as a genuine, popular nationalist. Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, having been educated in Moscow, was regarded as anything but a genuine nationalist. Again, I say rightly or wrongly, this is historical.
The other factor was that, in general, the Netherlands politically was staunch, stable, and not thinking about having a coalition in Government
[8]
with the Communist Party. France, on the other hand, was weak governmentally and unstable — could very easily have been pushed over into a coalition type government. So, the maintenance or the promotion of a strong centrist-oriented government in France was a great consideration, I think, and one reason why the United States didn’t press France harder on the question of Indochina and, in fact, sent great quantities of aid to the French expeditionary armed forces and those Indochinese fighting on the French side against the Viet Minh. In the case of Holland, you had a division of opinion within Holland itself as to whether or not they should try to hold on to the Netherlands Indies. Some excellent Dutch people were in disagreement, I think, with the Netherlands policy on pragmatic grounds. They didn’t think they had the force; they didn’t think they had the money; and they didn’t think it was worth the candle. The huge archipelago of the East Indies, with then some 70 million people, was perhaps too much for a small country the size of Holland (with about 1.0 million people then) to try to control indefinitely. The
[9]
government, however, was in a bind. They had strong tires with Indonesia, and they felt a certain responsibility for it, which was quite correct. They wanted, at least, an orderly transition to some form, first, of a union with the Netherlands under the Dutch Queen. Then, perhaps, gradually, as the institutions of self-government were developed, they would turn more and more power over. But they felt an obligation for the defense of Indonesia; they felt an obligation for its financial responsibilities; and they also felt that once order was restored there would be a good partnership arrangement beneficial to both sides that would be possible. So, you had this division of opinion within Holland itself.
Thank you very much for the reference to the interview with Ambassador Frederick Nolting!
His discussion of the matter could only help lure us still deeper into the realm of speculations. It obviously gives rise to the question as to what the United States would have done, had Vietnamese non-Communists been able to prevent the seizure of power by Communists in August 1945. My guess is that at the end of the day the American government would have acquiesced to France’s reconquest of Vietnam, no matter who was/were in charge of its independence movement. The United States at the time could not ignore or oppose the desire, however delusional, of a big ally in the all-important European theater to maintain its grandeur at the global level. Ambassador Nolting was, of course, too much a diplomatic veteran to say it bluntly, but he seemed to have alluded to this point by attributing to “[s]ome excellent Dutch people” the thought that “[t]he huge archipelago of the East Indies, with then some 70 million people, was perhaps too much for a small country the size of Holland (with about 1.0 million people then) to try to control indefinitely.”
Another historical analogy than VN/Philippines has been more talked about , it’ s HCM / Tito
I agree , one cannot talk about a lost historical opportunity , when one remembers the then world and internal USA context . The Cold War has reared its head when Churchill in his famed 1946 speech about the Iron Curtain assailed Soviet hold on Eastern Europe
Inside the USA , anticommunism was already brewing since 1917 , there was the first Red Scare after the birth of the Soviet Union . Soon after the Soviet acquisition of the H bomb , the catching of Soviet spies ( i.e. Rosenbergs ) , tha Americans became obsessional anti communists as materialized by the McCarthy witchhunts which raged from 1947 to 1953